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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 We are asked to decide whether a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty may be maintained under section 502(a)(3)(B) of 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B), where, despite reservation 
clauses that the company retained the right to terminate the 
plans "at any time" and for "any reason," summary plan 
descriptions informed retired employees that the duration of 
their retiree medical benefits was for life, and company 
representatives misinformed employees that once they retired, 
their medical benefits would "be continued for the rest of your 
life."  Because we hold that a breach of fiduciary claim may be 
maintained under these circumstances, we must also decide whether 
equitable relief is available under ERISA to individual plan 
participants.  We hold that, assuming a breach of fiduciary duty 
can be proven, equitable relief is available to individual plan 
participants pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). 
 
 I. 
 This class action, filed on behalf of former employees 
of Sperry Corporation, arises out of the termination of post-
retirement medical plans, sponsored by Unisys for retirees and 
disabled former employees of Unisys and its corporate 
predecessors, Sperry Corporation and Burroughs Corporation.  The 
retirees sought to recover post-retirement medical benefits under 
  
the terms of their benefit plans and under ERISA's provisions for 
appropriate equitable relief.   
 In September of 1986, Sperry Corporation and Burroughs 
Corporation merged to form Unisys Corporation.  Prior to the 
merger, Sperry consisted of a number of business units or 
divisions.  Until 1984 each Sperry division maintained its own 
medical benefits program, with each described in a separate 
summary plan description.  In 1984, in an attempt to streamline 
the medical benefits plans and in response to rising medical 
costs, Sperry implemented Medflex, a corporate-wide medical 
benefits plan that applied to the entire Sperry Corporation.14  
Medflex was applied to future retirees only; existing retirees 
continued to receive coverage under the pre-Medflex plans which 
applied when they retired. 
 Following the merger in 1986, Unisys continued the 
Medflex plan for active employees and those who retired after its 
implementation but prior to April 2, 1989.  Unisys also continued 
all of the pre-Medflex plans for those who retired prior to 
Medflex's implementation.  In 1989, Unisys effected the 
consolidation of its retiree medical benefit plans when it 
created the Unisys Post-Retirement and Extended Disability 
Medical Plan to cover all employees who retired after April 1, 
1989, most of whom were former Sperry and Burroughs employees.    
                     
14
.   Medflex applied to all Sperry business units by January 
1, 1984, with the exception of one sub-group of the Sperry 
Division, which commenced participation in Medflex on January 1, 
1985. 
  
 On November 3, 1992, Unisys publicly announced that 
effective January 1, 1993, it was terminating all existing 
medical benefit plans and replacing all of the pre-existing 
medical plans with the new Unisys Post-Retirement and Extended 
Medical Disability Plan.  Under the new plan, retirees would be 
responsible for increasing levels of contributions until January 
1, 1995, when they would have to pay the full cost of their 
premiums.  Thus, the new plan sharply contrasted with earlier 
plans, under the majority of which Unisys paid the entire premium 
for an individual's life and provided benefits for the 
individual's spouse as well.15   
                     
15
.   Unisys' decision to terminate the benefit plans under 
which it had provided coverage and to replace those plans with 
the new Unisys Post-Retirement and Extended Disability Medical 
Plan was challenged in nine separate actions which the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred to the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and consolidated for disposition.  On 
June 9, 1993, after determining that Unisys "acted on grounds 
generally applicable to the class," the district court certified 
the case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).  
The class consists of approximately 21,000 former non-union 
employees of Sperry, Burroughs and Unisys.  The court certified 
three distinct classes:  Unisys retirees, Sperry retirees or 
Burroughs retirees and the claims of each class were adjudicated 
separately.  Further, the retirees asserted two sets of claims:  
general claims on behalf of all retirees, and separate claims on 
behalf of "early" retirees who retired under various early 
retirement incentive programs offered by the company throughout 
the 1980s.   
 
 This appeal concerns some of the claims of the Sperry 
regular retirees, and the claims of a sub-group of Sperry early 
retirees.  The appeals docketed at Nos. 94-1800, 94-1801, 94-1912 
and 94-2216 concern the claims of the Unisys and Burroughs 
retirees, as well as the remaining claims of the Sperry retirees.  
In appeal No. 94-1800 the Sperry regular retirees and certain 
early retirees have appealed from an adverse judgment rendered 
after trial on their claims for breach of contract and estoppel.  
The claims of the Burroughs early retirees and many of the claims 
  
 The appellees in this appeal are former employees of 
Sperry corporation (and their eligible dependents) who retired 
between 1969 and April 1, 1989, from Sperry Corporation or 
Unisys, Sperry's successor.  Following Unisys' termination of 
their post-retirement medical benefit plans in late 1992, the 
retirees sought relief based on three theories:  breach of 
contract, equitable estoppel, and breach of fiduciary duty.  The 
Sperry retirees argued that Unisys' termination of their 
respective medical plans violated ERISA.  They argued first that 
Unisys had denied them "vested" benefits in violation of 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) because the summary plan descriptions 
("SPDs") explaining their medical benefits contained the term 
"lifetime" benefits.  Regarding their contract claims, the 
retirees relied on the explicit lifetime language in the plans, 
e.g., "when you retire, your medical benefit will be continued 
(..continued) 
of the Sperry early retirees were settled pursuant to a partial 
settlement agreement between Unisys and these retirees.  In 
appeal No. 94-1801 the Unisys early retirees have appealed from 
an adverse judgment rendered after trial on their claims for 
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and estoppel.  In 
appeal No. 94-1912 the Burroughs and Unisys regular retirees have 
appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Unisys on their breach of contract and estoppel claims.  
In appeal No. 94-2166, a sub-group of Sperry retirees attempted 
to challenge the partial settlement between Unisys and the Sperry 
and Burroughs early retirees which did not include them.  On 
October 3, 1994, we granted the parties' joint motion to 
consolidate appeals Nos. 94-1800, 94-1801, 94-1875 and 94-1912 
for purposes of filing a single joint appendix and for 
disposition.  All of these appeals have now been resolved, either 
by our decisions in published opinions, see Nos. 94-1800 and 94-
1875, or by memorandum opinions rendered in Nos. 94-1801, 94-1912 
and 94-2216. 
  
for the rest of your life," and on statements to the same effect 
made by the company both orally and in writing.   
 The Medflex SPD is illustrative.  A Sperry employee who 
retired during the period January 1, 1984, through April 1, 1989, 
received medical benefits under this plan.  The SPD for medical 
benefits is set forth in a booklet titled, "Your Company and 
You."  Included in this plan was the following description of 
retiree medical benefit coverage: 
 If you're eligible, Medical Plan benefits 
continue without cost after you terminate 
active employment.  Benefits also may 
continue on a contributory basis for your 
eligible dependents who are covered when your 
employment terminated. . . .  Coverage 
continues for you for life and for your 
dependents while they remain eligible 
provided you don't stop the contributions for 
their coverage.  After your death, your 
eligible dependents may continue coverage by 
making the require contributions.  Their 
coverage continues until your spouse dies or 
remarries. 
 
(A 2227)(emphasis added).  Second, the retirees argued that even 
if Unisys had the legal right to terminate the plans (pursuant to 
the reservation of rights clause located in other sections of the 
plans), Unisys had breached its fiduciary duty by affirmatively 
misleading plan participants regarding the duration of their 
retiree medical benefits.  Lastly, the retirees asserted claims 
based on equitable estoppel.16   
                     
16
.   The Sperry retirees' contract and estoppel claims are 
not implicated in this appeal.  They are the subject of an appeal 
docketed at 94-1800. 
  
 Unisys' response to these arguments was that it had 
reserved the right to terminate the retirees' medical plans due 
to a "reservation of rights clause" or "ROR" located in another 
section of the plan.  Typical of these clauses is the one set 
forth in the SPD describing the Medflex plan.  The Medflex SPD 
booklet, "Your Company and You," was distributed to all employees 
and contained the following reservation of rights clause: 
 Plan Continuation 
 
 The Company expects to continue the Plans, 
but reserves the right to change or end them 
at any time.  The Company's decision to 
change or end the Plan may be due to changes 
in federal or state laws governing welfare or 
retirement benefits, the requirements of the 
IRS or ERISA, the provisions of a contract or 
policy involving an insurance company or any 
other reason . . . . 
 
(A 2750) (emphasis added).   
 In addition to the provisions set forth in the SPDs, 
information about retiree medical benefits was also conveyed to 
the Sperry retirees through various informal oral and written 
communications.  As in the SPDs, the duration of medical benefits 
was described as being "for life" or for the "lifetime" of the 
retiree and his or her spouse.  Sperry did not include in these 
informal communications a reference to the reservation of rights 
clause.   
 Notwithstanding these communications, Unisys denied 
having created vested medical benefits through its use of the 
word "lifetime," and early in this litigation filed a motion for 
summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of the regular 
  
retirees' claims based on the unambiguous reservation of rights 
clauses in the plans.17  On October 13, 1993, the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Unisys on the Sperry 
retirees' claim that Unisys had breached its fiduciary duties.  
In re Unisys, 837 F. Supp. at 670, 679-80 (E.D. Pa. 1993).    
 At the trial conducted on their contract claim, the 
Sperry retirees moved for reconsideration of their breach of 
fiduciary duty claim in light of our decision, rendered during 
trial, in Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health and Welfare 
Fund, in which we held that a direct action for breach of 
fiduciary duty is available under section 1132(a)(3)(B).18  
Bixler, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1994).  The retirees argued that 
"even if the reservation of rights clause in the SPDs were 
intended to apply to existing retirees [as opposed to active 
employees], Sperry and later Unisys, had a fiduciary duty to make 
this point clear."  (A 2284).  The district court observed: 
                     
17
.   Although the district court granted Unisys' motion on 
the retirees' breach of fiduciary duty and estoppel claims, it 
denied summary judgment on the retirees' contract claim.  The 
district court found that the internal inconsistency between the 
lifetime promises and the RORs made the Sperry plans ambiguous 
and that under Mellon Bank N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, 619 
F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1980), a trial on the extrinsic evidence was 
necessary to resolve the ambiguity.  In re Unisys, 837 F. Supp. 
at 679.  After trial, the district court reversed its position on 
both the contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims, entering 
judgment against the Sperry retirees on the contract claim and 
reversing its earlier dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim. 
18
.   The district court opined that the Sperry retirees had 
presumably brought their breach of fiduciary duty claim pursuant 
to the "other equitable relief" clause in 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(3)(B). 
  
 This is not a case where one or two low level 
benefits counselors told a few retirees that 
their benefits would continue for life.  The 
message that medical benefits would last for 
life was confirmed repeatedly and 
systematically throughout the Sperry 
organization, by all levels of management, in 
writing and verbally.  In fact, as the 
Findings make clear, several high level 
corporate executives, as well as personnel 
managers, testified that they believed the 
[reservation of rights clause] was 
inapplicable to retirees and counseled 
individuals accordingly. 
 
(A 2284).  Although the district court also observed that the 
summary plan description is the controlling document upon which 
plan participants must rely and that informal communications 
cannot alter the terms of a written plan, the court discerned "a 
strong current in the Third Circuit that recognizes that an ERISA 
fiduciary may not `affirmatively mislead' plan participants."  
Id. (citing Bixler, 12 F.3d 1292, and Fischer v. Phila. Elec. 
Co., 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 622 
(1993)). 
 Unisys argued that Bixler, supra, and Fischer, supra, 
were inapposite in a situation where the summary plan description 
itself informs the participants of the answer to their inquiry 
regarding benefits.  After reviewing Fischer and Bixler, the 
district court concluded that the evidence supported a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim.  The court stated, "First, it is clear that 
the highest levels of corporate management at Sperry, and later 
Unisys, recognized that employees might be under the mistaken 
  
belief that `lifetime' meant forever."19  The evidence suggested 
to the court that "by the mid-1980's, defendant understood the 
potential for confusion concerning the meaning of `lifetime 
benefits.'"  The court further observed that the "Defendant then 
exacerbated this potential [for confusion] with numerous informal 
communications that discussed lifetime benefits without explicit 
reference to the [reservation of rights clause]."20  (A 2289).   
                     
19
.   The court found that this was evidenced in part by a 
confidential letter in which John Loughlin, who was then staff 
Vice President, Employees Benefits for Sperry, wrote: 
 
 It is important to determine the implied promise that 
has been made regarding post-retirement medical 
benefits.  Recent court cases have impaired the 
employer's ability to reduce these benefits after 
retirement.  The Company should consider how the 
promise can be limited so as to control the impact on 
Company costs of future medical inflation and Federal 
cost-shifting. 
 
(A 2288).  The second letter upon which the district court relied 
was a confidential 1988 memorandum from J.A. Blain, then Vice-
President of Human Resources for Unisys, to W.M. Blumenthal, then 
CEO of Unisys, which cautioned: 
 
 Although we have not suggested to either active 
employees or current retirees that we may consider 
changes in Post Retirement Medical for those already 
retired, we feel our analysis would be incomplete if we 
did not address possible changes to the Post-Retirement 
Medical Plans of our 16,000 current retirees. . . .  
Many retirees will undoubtedly suggest that when they 
retired, they felt that their medical program would 
continue without changes. . . . 
 
(A 2288). 
20
.   The district court found that "Unisys could have easily 
put an explicit [reservation of rights clause] in each informal 
communication given to employees rather than only use the 
lifetime language; also, when employees made specific inquiries 
to benefit counselors during exit interviews and at group 
retirement sessions, the company could have instructed the 
  
 The court found that the retirees had presented 
credible testimony that some individuals specifically asked if 
their benefits would continue for life and were told they would, 
without any mention of the reservation of rights clause.  (A 
2290).  When faced with a specific inquiry as to the explanation 
of benefits, the district court held that "an employer cannot 
give vague or incorrect answers, especially on a repeated and 
pervasive basis."  Id.  Because the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim was not directly before the court at trial, it did not hold 
that a breach in fact occurred.  In granting reconsideration of 
this issue though, the district court concluded that "based on 
the evidence and the law in this circuit, it seems possible that 
at least some plaintiffs will be able to sustain a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim."21  (A 2291).  Given the complexity of the 
legal question involved and its uncertainty of the contours of 
Bixler, the district court certified its decision for 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  On July 
22, 1994, Unisys filed a petition for permission to appeal 
(..continued) 
counselors to tell prospective employees that although the word 
`lifetime' is used, the company always reserves its right to 
terminate the plans."  (A 2289-90). 
21
.   Because the court believed that some plaintiffs had 
stronger cases than others based on their specific inquiries and 
the information given to them personally, the court found that 
subclasses, and possibly even individual hearings, would be 
necessary to adjudicate the breach of fiduciary duty claims.  The 
court did not express an opinion as to what damages would be 
recoverable and recognized that the parties would brief the issue 
at a later time.   
  
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  We granted Unisys' petition on 
August 8, 1994.22  
 
 II. 
 Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA provides that "a fiduciary 
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries . . . ."  29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).23  Recognizing this statutory obligation, we 
                     
22
.   The district court certified for immediate appeal and 
we accepted the following controlling questions of law: 
 
  (a)  May a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim be maintained under ERISA where: 
 
       (1)  the applicable summary plan 
descriptions ("SPDs") informed class members 
that the duration of retiree medical benefits 
was for life, but reservation clauses in the 
SPDs stated that the company reserved the 
right to terminate the plans at any time and 
for any reason; and  
 
       (2)  company representatives 
misinformed class members that once they 
retired, their medical benefits would 
continue for life, as detailed in the Court's 
Opinion of June 23, 1994? 
 
  (b)  Assuming that a breach of fiduciary 
duty claim may be maintained under the above 
circumstances, is equitable relief available 
to individual participants under ERISA? 
23
.   ERISA broadly defines a fiduciary as any person who 
"exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control 
respecting management of such plan . . . or has any discretionary 
authority in the responsibility in the administration of the 
plan."  29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).   
 
 There is no question that both Sperry and later Unisys 
were acting as plan administrators, and thus were acting in a 
fiduciary capacity, when they made the material 
  
have held that in the exercise of these duties, the fiduciary 
"may not materially mislead those to whom the duties of loyalty 
and prudence . . . are owed."  Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135; Bixler, 
12 F.3d at 1300; Curcio v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance 
Co., 33 F.3d 226, 238 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 In Fischer, we held that a plan administrator may not 
make affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants 
about changes to employee benefit plans.  Fischer involved 
employees who retired shortly before their employer offered an 
early retirement plan or "retirement sweetener."  Although the 
company had announced that it might offer such a plan, when 
employees inquired about its availability, they were told by 
benefits counselors that "no plan was being considered."  
Fischer, 994 F.2d at 132.  The benefit counselors were 
technically telling the truth, since they had not been informed 
by the corporation that a retirement sweetener was under serious 
(..continued) 
misrepresentations that support the claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty in this case.  Our decisions firmly establish that when a 
plan administrator explains plan benefits to its employees, it 
acts in a fiduciary capacity.  See, e.g., Genter v. ACME Scale 
and Supply Co., 776 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that ACME 
Scale and Supply met the ERISA definition of fiduciary as an 
employer-administrator of the plan at issue); Fischer v. Phila. 
Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding employer to 
have fiduciary status solely on the basis of its role as plan 
administrator under ERISA); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 
908 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that when employers 
serve as plan administrators, they assume the role of fiduciary 
under ERISA).  When a corporate plan administrator speaks about 
benefits to its employees, the administrator acts in a fiduciary 
capacity even if he speaks about a non-fiduciary decision such as 
the business decision to terminate a welfare benefit plan.  See 
Hozier, supra. 
  
consideration.  Nonetheless, we held that a material issue of 
fact existed as to whether the employer had breached its 
fiduciary duty to its employees by responding in a misleading 
fashion to their questions about the sweetener.  Id. at 135.  We 
held that, "Put simply, when a plan administrator speaks, it must 
speak truthfully."  Id. 
 We affirmed this principle in Bixler in holding that a 
plan administrator has an affirmative duty to "speak when it 
knows that silence might be harmful."  There the widow of a plan 
participant contacted her husband's employer while the COBRA 
election period was still open, to ask whether there was a death 
benefit to which she was entitled.  We held that: 
 If [the employer's agent] knew that Mr. 
Bixler's death left Mrs. Bixler with 
substantial unpaid medical expenses and that 
she could receive reimbursement for those 
expenses under the Drivers' plan by signing 
and returning the COBRA notice that [he] had 
sent to her husband, we believe the failure 
to advise her of the available benefits might 
be found to be a breach of fiduciary duty 
despite the fact that her inquiry was limited 
to the availability of a death benefit. 
 
12 F.3d at 1302.  Although we did not decide whether a breach of 
fiduciary duty in fact occurred, we observed that the fiduciary's 
duty to inform "entails not only a negative duty not to 
misinform, but also an affirmative duty to inform when the 
trustee knows that silence might be harmful."  Id. at 1300.  
Significantly, we held that the employer's failure to advise Mrs. 
Bixler regarding her COBRA rights could constitute a breach of 
its fiduciary duty even though the employer had previously 
  
provided the information in a written COBRA notice24 and even 
though the employer's omission in that case concerned facts about 
which Mrs. Bixler had not specifically inquired. 
 Similarly in Curcio v. John Hancock Mutual Life 
Insurance Co., 33 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 1994), we held that an 
employer's misrepresentations regarding the existence of 
supplemental accidental death and dismemberment insurance, in 
representations made to employees during solicitations for 
enrollment in a new life insurance program which provided only 
for supplemental life insurance, established a breach of 
fiduciary claim.  See also Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 
131 (3d Cir. 1993) (employer's erroneous representations that 
Smith would receive some level of coverage under new plan gives 
rise to a breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA); Taylor v. 
Peoples Natural Gas Co., 49 F.3d 982 (3d Cir. 1995) (a plan 
administrator may be liable for the material misrepresentations 
made by individuals who have been selected as non-fiduciary 
agents by the plan administrator to assist it in its fiduciary 
obligation to administer a plan).  
 Unisys argues that the district court's decision in 
this case is based on an unwarranted extension of our holding in 
Bixler.  Unisys points to the fact that Sperry and later Unisys 
                     
24
.   Mrs. Bixler received the requisite notice that she had 
a right to elect "COBRA" contribution coverage at her own 
expense, but she did not do so, believing that the COBRA notice 
did not apply to her since her husband was already in the 
hospital and she mistakenly believed that this precluded him from 
being eligible for coverage.  Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1302.   
  
unambiguously advised employees in summary plan descriptions that 
the company had reserved the right to terminate its retiree 
medical benefit plans.  Thus, Unisys contends that Bixler did not 
address the principal issue in this appeal which Unisys frames as 
"whether an employer has a fiduciary duty to remind its employees 
of its right to modify or terminate a benefit plan when it 
already disclosed that information in an SPD."  Appellants' brief 
at p. 19.  We reject Unisys' characterization of the fiduciary 
duty involved as "one to remind" and of the cases upon which 
Unisys relies. 
 Under ERISA, fiduciaries have certain duties which 
include "the disclosure of specified information."  Massachusetts 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142-45 (1985).  A 
fiduciary's statutory disclosure obligations are set forth in 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1021 and 1022.  Under 29 U.S.C. § 
1102(a)(1), "[e]very employee benefit plan shall be established 
and maintained pursuant to a written instrument . . . ."  Under 
section 1022(a), "[a] summary plan description of employee 
benefit plan is to be furnished to plan participants" and the 
plan description "shall be sufficiently accurate and 
comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and 
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan."  
29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1).  Further, ERISA requires that the summary 
plan description "explain the circumstances which may result in 
disqualification, ineligibility, or denial or loss of benefits," 
29 U.S.C. § 1022(b), "in a manner that is calculated to be 
understood by the average plan participant."  29 U.S.C. § 
  
1022(a)(1).25  A summary plan description "must not have the 
effect [of] misleading, misinforming or failing to inform 
                     
25
.   § 1021.   Duty of Disclosure and Reporting 
 
  (a)  Summary plan description and information to 
       participants and beneficiaries 
 
     The administrator of each employee benefit plan 
shall cause to be furnished in accordance with 
section 1024(b) of this title to each participant 
covered under the plan and to each beneficiary who 
is receiving benefits under the plan -- 
   
     (1)  a summary plan description described 
in section 1022(a)(1) of this title; and  
 
 *   *   *   * 
 
 § 1022.  Plan Description and summary plan description 
 
  (a)(1)  A summary plan description of any employee 
benefit plan shall be furnished to participants 
and beneficiaries as provided in section 1024(b) 
of this title.  The summary plan description shall 
include the information described in subsection 
(b) of this section, shall be written in a manner 
calculated to be understood by the average plan 
participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate 
and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such 
participants and beneficiaries of their rights and 
obligations under the plan.  A summary of any 
material modification in terms of the plan and any 
change in the information required under 
subsection (b) of this section shall be written in 
a manner calculated to be understood by the 
average plan participant and shall be furnished in 
accordance with section 1024(b)(1) of this title. 
 
     *   *   *   * 
 
  (b)  The plan description and summary plan 
description shall contain the following 
information:  The name and type of administration 
of the plan; the name and address of the person 
designated as agent for the service of legal 
process, if such person is not the administrator; 
the name and address of the administrator; names, 
  
participants and beneficiaries."  29 C.F.R. § 2520-102-2(b) 
(1987). 
 Unisys argues that we should reject the notion that 
Bixler can be interpreted as imposing a broad duty to inform 
"upon a fiduciary that has satisfied its statutory disclosure 
obligations."  Unisys is correct that we have held that a 
fiduciary may satisfy its statutory disclosure obligations 
regarding the terms of a plan by distributing a summary plan 
description that complies with ERISA.  See, e.g., Stahl v. Tony's 
Bldg. Materials Inc., 975 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding 
employee trust fund did not breach its fiduciary duty to a union 
member by failing to warn him individually that his pension 
benefits could be drastically reduced where the rule that applied 
was adequately explained in the summary plan description); Allen 
(..continued) 
titles, and addresses of any trustee or trustees 
(if they are persons different from the 
administrator); a description of the relevant 
provisions of any applicable collective bargaining 
agreement; the plan's requirements respecting 
eligibility for participation and benefits; a 
description of the provisions providing for 
nonforfeitable pension benefits; circumstances 
which may result in disqualification, 
ineligibility, or denial or loss of benefits; the 
source of financing of the plan and the identity 
of any organization through which benefits are 
provided; the date of the end of the plan year and 
whether the records of the plan are kept on a 
calendar, policy, or fiscal year basis; the 
procedures to be following in presenting claims 
for benefits under the plan and the remedies 
available under the plan for the redress of claims 
which are denied in whole or in part (including 
procedures required under section 1133 of this 
title). 
  
v. Atlantic Richfield Retirement Plan, 480 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 
1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Congress did not 
intend to impose a duty to provide the kind of individualized 
attention urged by plaintiff here, but rather envisioned that a 
fiduciary could discharge its obligations through the use of an 
explanatory booklet"); Schlomchik v. Retirement Plan of 
Amalgamated Ins. Fund, 502 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 
671 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1981) ("no duty on the part of defendants 
to provide this particular employee with individualized attention 
. . . ."); Schiffer v. Equitable Assurance Sec. of the U.S., 838 
F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that a fiduciary owed 
an obligation to a beneficiary to explain the terms of a written 
plan).  These cases, however, are inapplicable here.  In each of 
them, breach of fiduciary duty claims were rejected because the 
plan documents clearly explained the benefits in question; none 
involved allegations that a breach of fiduciary duty had occurred 
because a plan administrator had affirmatively and materially 
misrepresented the terms of a plan.  Furthermore, satisfaction by 
an employer as plan administrator of its statutory disclosure 
obligations under ERISA does not foreclose the possibility that 
the plan administrator may nonetheless breach its fiduciary duty 
owed plan participants to communicate candidly if the plan 
administrator simultaneously or subsequently makes material 
misrepresentations to those whom the duty of loyalty and prudence 
are owed. 
 Contrary to Unisys' claim, this is not a case involving 
an employer's "duty to remind".  Instead, this case is more 
  
accurately characterized as a dispute over an employer's duty, as 
an ERISA fiduciary, not to misinform employees through material 
misrepresentations and incomplete, inconsistent or contradictory 
disclosures.  In the present context, a misrepresentation is 
material if there is a substantial likelihood that it would 
mislead a reasonable employee in making an adequately informed 
retirement decision.  Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 
at 135.  Here the district court found that Unisys affirmatively 
and systematically represented to its employees that once they 
retired, their medical benefits would continue for life -- even 
though as the district court concluded in rejecting the retirees' 
contract claim, the plans clearly permitted the company to 
terminate benefits.26  We have no doubt that the conduct Unisys 
engaged in, based on the findings of the district court, would 
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty in its most basic form.  
Our decisions in Bixler, Fischer, Curcio and Smith firmly 
establish that when a plan administrator affirmatively 
misrepresents the terms of a plan or fails to provide information 
                     
26
.   We have previously held that the Sperry retirees did 
not have a claim for relief based on breach of contract due to 
the unambiguous language of the reservation of rights clauses.  
See In re Unisys, No. 94-1800, slip opinion (3d Cir. June 28, 
1995).  This decision does not foreclose the retirees' claims for 
relief based on a breach of fiduciary duty.  In Curcio, supra, we 
upheld Mrs. Curcio's claim for breach of fiduciary duty, even 
though we had rejected her contract claim arising out of the same 
set of circumstances.  See also Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 
746, 753 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (April 
24, 1995) (Howe I, in which plaintiffs' contract-type claims that 
benefits had vested were rejected, does not bar plaintiffs from 
urging in Howe II that they were entitled to relief on the basis 
of breach of fiduciary duty or estoppel).   
  
when it knows that its failure to do so might cause harm, the 
plan administrator has breached its fiduciary duty to individual 
plan participants and beneficiaries.   
 Imposing upon an employer a fiduciary duty in this case 
does not threaten or contradict our well-established policy 
disfavoring informal plan amendments.27  We recently recognized 
                     
27
.   Unisys argues that we recently recognized the 
"troubling implications" of a misrepresentation claim based upon 
alleged oral misrepresentations to plan participants where 
accurate information was available in a summary plan description.  
(Unisys brief at pp. 31-32).  Unisys directs our attention to a 
footnote in our decision in Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons 
Ltd Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 24 F.3d 1491, 1501 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1994) in which we stated: 
 
 Thus, we do not reach the question whether 
Haberern's misrepresentation argument could 
be upheld under Section 502(a)(3).  [citation 
omitted].  We do note, however, that 
Haberern's misrepresentation argument has 
troubling implications because the summary 
plan description pages given to her made it 
clear that the retirement benefit was based 
on compensation and the compensation did not 
include bonuses.  [citations omitted].  Of 
course, the summary plan description mirrored 
the plan itself.  Thus, Haberern effectively 
is relying on parol evidence to contradict 
clearly defined terms of a plan revealed to 
her in writing.  Accordingly, if we adopt her 
approach we will create a precedent for any 
beneficiary to make claims for benefits 
beyond those provided in a plan.  It would be 
difficult to reconcile that result with our 
cases holding that oral or informal 
amendments to ERISA benefit plans are 
precluded.  See Confer v. Custom Eng'g Co., 
952 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 1991); Frank v. Colt 
Indus. Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 98 (3d Cir. 1990); 
Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 18 
F.3d 1034, 1040 (3d Cir. 1994), rev'd and 
remanded on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 115 
S. Ct. 1223 (1995) ("Unless and until the 
written plan is altered in a manner, and by a 
  
in Curcio, supra, that our equitable theories of relief under 
ERISA (breach of fiduciary duty and estoppel) are "not to be 
construed as conflicting with our precedent precluding oral or 
informal amendments to ERISA benefit plans.  33 F.3d at 236 n.17. 
 The retirees here do not argue that Unisys' 
misrepresentations modified their retiree medical benefit plans.  
Rather, for purposes of their breach of fiduciary claim, they 
assume the plans did not contractually vest benefits, and claim 
instead that the company breached its fiduciary duty by leading 
employees to believe that the plans did.  This claim is distinct 
from a claim for benefits under the terms of the plan because it 
requires different proof (proof of fiduciary status, 
misrepresentations, company knowledge of the confusion and 
resulting harm to the employees) than would be required for a 
contract claim that the plans had been modified.  
 In recognizing the retirees' breach of fiduciary claim 
here, we do not intend to "create a precedent for any beneficiary 
to make claims beyond those provided in a plan."  See Haberern, 
24 F.3d 1492, 1501 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994).  However, the facts and 
circumstances in this case clearly warrant our recognition of a 
(..continued) 
person or persons authorized in the plan, 
neither the plan administrator nor a court is 
free to deviate from the terms of the 
original plan."). 
 
However, as the district court in Haberern observed, Haberern's 
claim (with respect to her bonus) was brought pursuant to section 
502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) and not under 
section 1132(a)(3)(B), the provision of ERISA pursuant to which 
the retirees' claims are brought here.  
  
claim of a fiduciary breach.  Here the district court found that 
virtually the entire company management had consistently 
misrepresented the plan, not just on one occasion or to one 
employee, but over a period of many years and both orally (in 
group meetings) and in writing (in newsletters) as well.  Under 
these circumstances, we do not find a conflict with our policy 
against informal plan modification.28 
                     
28
.   Finally, Unisys attempts to distinguish Bixler from 
this case "because in Bixler, the information which allegedly was 
not supplied to the participant involved current facts which if 
brought to the attention of the participant, would have avoided a 
current loss of benefits under the plan."  Unisys thus urges us 
to limit Bixler's application to a breach of fiduciary duty based 
upon a failure to disclose present circumstances that may affect 
an employee's present right to specific benefits under the terms 
of a plan.  Unisys maintains that there is no evidence that at 
the time of the oral and written communications regarding retiree 
medical benefit coverage, anyone within the company knew that 
Unisys would be terminating its retiree medical benefit plans in 
November, 1992. (See Appellants' brief at pp. 35-36: "at the time 
the lifetime benefits were provided to retirees the company was 
not anticipating discontinuing them.") 
 
 We have previously held that ERISA does not "impose a 
duty of clairvoyance" under which employers would be required to 
advise participants and beneficiaries of the risk of plan changes 
not even being contemplated.  See Curtiss-Wright, 18 F.2d at 
1042, n. 7.  See also Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135 (an ERISA 
fiduciary is under no obligation to offer precise predictions 
about future changes to its plan).  Our holding today should not 
be interpreted as creating a fiduciary obligation to predict and 
disclose future possibilities or potentialities to plan 
participants.  
 
 We accept Unisys' contention that at the time lifetime 
benefits were promised, no one at Sperry ever intended or 
anticipated that there would one day be the need to reduce or 
eliminate retiree medical benefits.  Nonetheless, an ERISA 
fiduciary does have an obligation to "answer participants' 
questions forthrightly," Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135, and "a duty to 
communicate complete and accurate information about a 
beneficiary's status."  Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance, 919 F.2d 
746, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  This was the obligation that was 
  
 We turn now to the evidence adduced at trial on the 
breach of contract claim to see if sufficient evidence would 
support the other elements of the breach of fiduciary duty claim, 
specifically, Unisys' knowledge that its employees were mislead 
by Unisys' misrepresentations and Unisys' knowledge that its 
misrepresentations were material to the beneficiaries' 
circumstance because the misrepresentations influenced their 
decisions to retire. 
 
(..continued) 
breached in this case.  The district court found that the 
retirees had presented credible testimony that some individuals 
specifically asked if their benefits would continue for life and 
were told they would, without any mention of the reservation of 
rights clauses.  (A 2290 n.69).  Employees were told, "Once you 
retire and take your first pension check from the company . . . 
that's it."  (A 2534).  Thus, while Unisys may not have 
anticipated ending the plans, it knew that it had the ability to 
do so and it knew that its employees were receiving answers to 
their specific inquiries that were vague, misleading and 
contradictory.   
 
 Unisys' situation was not completely unanticipated.  
Indeed, the company had the foresight to draft and incorporate 
reservation of rights clauses into its retiree medical plans, 
which expressly gave the company the right to terminate the plans 
if they became onerous.  Unisys was aware of the retirees' 
confusion regarding the applicability of these clauses to their 
benefits and the retirees' mistaken belief that their benefits 
could not be terminated once an employee retired.  Under these 
circumstances, we find a duty to convey complete and accurate 
information arose.   
 
  
 III. 
 In detailed and well-supported findings, the district 
court found that Unisys had knowledge that its employees believed 
the assurances of lifetime benefits they had been given and were 
making retirement decisions based on their understanding that 
when they retired, the benefits that they had at the time they 
retired would continue for life.  Uncontroverted evidence 
established that Unisys' executives were aware that the lifetime 
medical benefit was an important consideration for employees who 
were considering when to retire.  This evidence established that 
the company knew that employees accelerated their retirement 
plans because of the belief that by retiring at a certain point 
in time, they would "lock in" the lifetime coverage that they had 
under the current plan.29  Further, the district court found that 
once Unisys was aware of the fact that retirees were electing to 
retire based on this understanding, Unisys failed to do anything 
to correct the misinformation, and instead reinforced the 
misunderstanding by continuing to repeat the same assurances that 
upon retirement a retiree's benefits would continue for life. 
                     
29
.   The district court quoted testimony from Sperry's 
former Senior Vice President for Personnel, Frank Sweeten, who 
acknowledged that the lifetime promises made by Unisys to 
retiring employees was an influence in retirement decisions: 
 
 We said that this is yours for life.  You 
have got it for life.  And people made 
decisions on that.  They decided whether to 
go [i.e., retire] or not go on the basis that 
they were told this is for life. 
 
(A 2230 n.19). 
  
   The district court found that the company, both 
actively and affirmatively, systematically misinformed its 
employees about the duration of their benefits by stating over 
and over again, without qualification, that their benefits would 
continue for life: 
 There is no question that the defendant 
routinely spoke of the medical benefits as 
continuing "for life".  This message was 
conveyed time and time again throughout 
informal communications that were sent out to 
retirees, and by oral statements that were 
made to these individuals both at private 
exit interviews and in group retirement 
sessions. 
 
(A 2281-82).  In addition to these communications in individual 
correspondence and company newsletters, the district court also 
cited examples of evidence that Unisys consistently responded to 
specific inquiries about whether a retiree's benefits could 
change by telling employees that they could not.  (A 2290).   
 Given these findings, we hold that the district court 
did not err as a matter of law in concluding that the duty to 
convey complete and accurate information that was material to its 
employees' circumstance arose from these facts since the trustees 
had to know that their silence might cause harm.  The district 
court's findings that the company actively misinformed its 
employees by affirmatively representing to them that their 
medical benefits were guaranteed once they retired, when in fact 
the company knew this was not true and that employees were making 
important retirement decisions relying upon this information, 
clearly support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.   
  
 We turn now to the remaining issue in this appeal, 
whether relief is available to individual plan participants under 
ERISA.   
 
 IV. 
 In Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health-Welfare Fund, 
12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993), we held that where a fiduciary 
breach causes harm to a beneficiary, that beneficiary has a claim 
for equitable relief pursuant to section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 
which authorizes suits by participants for "appropriate equitable 
relief" to redress violations of ERISA.30  Relying on our 
                     
30
.   Section 502 of ERISA provides: 
 
 (a)  Persons empowered to bring a civil 
action  
 
 A civil action may be brought -- 
 
 (1) by a participant or beneficiary -- 
 
  (A) for the relief provided for in 
subsection (c) of this section, or 
 
  (B) to recover benefits due to him 
under the terms of his plan, to 
enforce his rights under the terms 
of the plan, or to clarify his 
rights to future benefits under the 
terms of the plan; 
 
 (2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, 
beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate 
relief under section 1109 of this title; 
 
 (3)  by a participant, beneficiary, or 
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice 
which violates any provision of this 
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) 
to obtain other appropriate equitable relief 
  
decision in Bixler, the district court concluded that equitable 
relief was available to individual plan participants for breach 
of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(3)(B).   
 In Bixler, we considered both the source and the scope 
of an ERISA fiduciary's duty to one of its beneficiaries and held 
that a direct action for breach of fiduciary duty exists in the 
"other appropriate equitable relief" clause of section 
502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B).  Recognizing 
that "undoubtedly there will be instances in which a fiduciary's 
actions harm an individual beneficiary, but do not harm the 
plan," we adopted the approach of Justice Brennan's concurrence 
in Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 
(1985) to hold that "section 502(a)(3) authorizes the award of 
`appropriate equitable relief' directly to a participant or 
beneficiary to `redress' any act or practice which violates any 
provision of this title including a breach of the statutorily 
created fiduciary duty of an administrator."  Bixler, 12 F.3d at 
1298 (citing Massachusetts Mutual, 473 U.S. at 153).31  We held 
(..continued) 
(i) to redress such violations or (ii) to 
enforce any provisions of this subchapter or 
the terms of the plan. . . . 
31
.   In Massachusetts Mutual, the Supreme Court addressed 
the question whether an ERISA fiduciary could be held personally 
liable to a participant or beneficiary for extra contractual 
damages caused by the improper or untimely processing of benefits 
claims.  The plaintiff had sued only under ERISA's fiduciary duty 
section, section 409(a), and its civil enforcement section, 
section 502(a)(2); thus the court's holding was similarly 
limited.  After examining the statutory language of these 
provisions, Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, 
concluded:  "The entire text of section 409 persuades us that 
Congress did not intend that section to authorize any relief [for 
  
that the principles of section 404(a), which serve as the 
touchstone for understanding the scope and object of an ERISA 
fiduciary's duties, are given effect by section 502(a)(3) which, 
in the language of the statute, authorizes the award of 
"appropriate equitable relief" directly to a participant or 
beneficiary to redress any act or practice which violates the 
provision of ERISA.  We observed, of course, that this relief is 
independent of that established in section 409, authorizing 
recovery for breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of the plan. 
 Unisys suggests that our conclusion in Bixler is called 
into question by the Supreme Court's decision in Mertens v. 
Hewitt Assoc., ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993), in which the 
Supreme Court held that money damages are not available under 
(..continued) 
breach of fiduciary duty] except for the plan itself."  
Massachusetts Mutual, 473 U.S. at 144. 
 
 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall and 
Blackmun, wrote separately to emphasize the limited reach of the 
majority opinion and to outline the proper approach for courts to 
take in construing other ERISA provisions.  In full agreement 
with the majority that section 409 did not authorize recovery to 
an individual, Justice Brennan explained that individual recovery 
for breach of fiduciary duty is available elsewhere in the 
statute, in the "other appropriate equitable relief" clause of 
section 502(a)(3), reasoning that allowing an injured beneficiary 
recourse through the courts is essential to fulfilling the 
purpose of ERISA.  Explaining that Congress intended this result, 
Justice Brennan found the fundamental purpose of the statute was 
the "enforcement of strict fiduciary standards of care in the 
administration of all aspects of pension plans and promotion of 
the best interests of participants and beneficiaries."  473 U.S. 
at 158.  See also id. at 152-53, citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 
93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5030, 5106 
(emphasizing that section 502 permits beneficiaries to bring a 
"civil action to recover benefits due under the plan, to clarify 
rights to receive future benefits under the plan, and for relief 
from breach of fiduciary responsibility") (emphasis added). 
  
section 502(a)(3), which, by its very terms, authorizes only 
equitable relief.  Although Unisys acknowledges that the Supreme 
Court in Mertens never addressed the question of whether, in the 
event of a breach of fiduciary duty, a plan participant could 
seek equitable relief on his own behalf (rather than on behalf of 
a plan), Unisys maintains that the Supreme Court in Mertens 
expressed an unwillingness to infer causes of action in the ERISA 
context.  See id. at 2067.32 
 We do not read Mertens as precluding the retirees' 
claim for equitable relief.  In a post-Mertens decision, the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the same 
conclusion and reversed the district court's holding that 
individual relief was not available under section 502(a)(3), 
holding instead, based on Mertens, that section 502(a)(3) 
authorized such relief.  Anweiler v. Amer. Elec. Power Serv. 
Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 993 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 In Mertens, the Court held that the 
"appropriate equitable relief" in section 
[502(a)(3)] included only typical remedies 
available in equity and not "legal remedies" 
like compensatory damages or monetary relief.  
The court limited its holding to the "narrow 
                     
32
.   Unisys observes that we did not mention Mertens in our 
opinion in Bixler, and that two other courts since Mertens have 
held that only the plan, and not individual plan participants or 
beneficiaries, are entitled to relief for a breach of a fiduciary 
duty based on their conclusion that the sole and exclusive bases 
for such relief are sections 409 and 502(a)(2) of ERISA, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1109 and 1132(a)(2).  See Richards v. General Motors 
Corp., 850 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Mich. 1994), and Kaiser Permanente 
Employees Pension Plan v. Bertozzi, 849 F. Supp. 692, 700 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994) (concluding that recovery under section 502(a)(3) is 
limited to "relief that inures to the benefit of the plan as a 
whole").   
  
battleground" chosen by the parties and 
decided the issue of "what forms of relief 
are available" under section 1132(a)(3), not 
to whom the relief can go or whether a 
remedial wrong had even been alleged.  
Nevertheless, Mertens clearly indicates the 
importance and availability of equitable 
relief.  Moreover, the Secretary of Labor in 
an amicus curiae brief argues [that] Mertens 
dictates the availability of relief to an 
individual under section 1132(a)(3) for a 
fiduciary's breach of duty.  Therefore, in 
light of Mertens and in deference to the 
Secretary's interpretation of the law which 
he is authorized to enforce, we hold that an 
individual may seek equitable relief from a 
breach of fiduciary duty under Section 
1132(a)(3). 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  The Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit reached the same result in Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 
746 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (April 24, 
1995).33  Thus, our decision in Bixler is consistent with the 
                     
33
.   Interestingly, the Court of Appeals in Howe relied on 
Mertens to vacate the district court's award of punitive and 
compensatory damages, but upheld its equitable remedies in the 
form of monetary restitution for back benefits and an injunction 
restoring future benefits under the plaintiffs' former medical 
plan.  With respect to Mertens, the court of appeals opined: 
 
 Mertens simply holds that only "equitable 
relief" is available under section 502(a)(3), 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), and that this phrase 
does not include the collection of damages 
from persons who are not fiduciaries but act 
in concert with those who are fiduciaries.  
Nothing in Mertens precludes an award of 
traditional equitable relief, including an 
injunction, restitution, and the like.  As 
plaintiffs now concede . . . after Mertens, 
compensatory damages are not recoverable 
under section 1132(a)(3).  But the case by no 
means bars equitable relief for individual 
participants who have suffered a breach of 
trust. 
  
decisions of the Courts of Appeal for the Seventh and Eighth 
Circuits.34  Accordingly, we reaffirm our conclusion in Bixler 
that equitable relief running to an individual falls within the 
scope both of section 1132(a)(3)'s language and of ERISA's broad 
remedial purpose.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).   
 A question left unanswered by Bixler is the form of 
equitable relief available under section 502(a)(3).  Both the 
district court and the Sperry retirees agree that the retirees 
are not entitled to money damages for a breach of fiduciary duty.  
Instead, the retirees seek an injunction ordering specific 
performance of the assurances Unisys made, restitutionary 
reimbursement for back benefits, and restoration of the status 
quo ante for the Sperry early retirees by rescinding their 
retirement agreements.  These are remedies which are 
restitutionary in nature and thus equitable.  See Curcio, 33 F.2d 
at 238-39 ("[W]e hold that Mrs. Curcio's alternate argument [that 
Capital Health breached its fiduciary duty] provides additional 
support for our conclusion that Capital Health is liable to Mrs. 
Curcio for the $150,000 in supplemental AD&D", representing full 
enforcement of the promise that had been made); Howe v. Varity 
Corp., 36 F.3d at 756 (award of monies plaintiffs would have 
received if they had remained members of the M-F plan could not 
properly be characterized as damages; rather, the payments were 
                     
34
.   The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a pre-
Mertens decision, held to the contrary.  Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1986) (beneficiary was not entitled to recover 
extra contractual damages for emotional distress caused by 
arbitrary and capricious acts of plan trustee). 
  
restitution).  It will be for the district court to determine 
which of these remedies are appropriate under the circumstances 
of these individual claims. 
 
 V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district 
court dated June 23, 1994, reinstating the retirees' claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty which was certified for appeal pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) by order entered July 12, 1994, will be 
affirmed.  This cause is remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
 
 
